434. The plaintiffs are not shown to have annoyed or disturbed other guests, or to have improperly demeaned themselves, or to have violated any rules of the hotel, and under suitable instructions the jury on conflicting evidence could find the defendant had been guilty of assault, false imprisonment and slander, by 'words spoken * * * imputing crime.'

"It follows that the plaintiffs' four requests, that if they were unlawfully restrained of their liberty the defendant is liable in damages, and if he incited, encouraged or countenanced the presence and acts of the officer he is liable therefor, and that damages may be assessed for humiliation and injury to the plaintiff's feelings, as well as for unwarranted disturbance of his right of privacy and exclusive use of the room for himself and wife, and that even if the entry of the defendant arose from some mistake made by him or his agents 'in his records,' such mistake would not amount to a justification, were unexceptionable. The defendant's ninth request, that if the plaintiff suffered no physical injury 'she cannot recover for mental suffering,' was properly denied. As we have said, he could not treat the plaintiffs with contumely by the use of insolent language concerning them, specifically set forth in the declaration, and referred to, and characterized in the record as 'slander,' which the jury could say caused the plaintiffs not only physical annoyance and discomfort, but also worry and distress of mind. De Wolf *v.* Ford, 193 N. Y. 397, 401, 86 N. E. 527, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 860, 127 Am. St. Rep. 969. The defendant's duty in this respect is analogous to that of a common carrier of passengers. Com. *v.* Power, 7 Metc. 596, 601, 41 Am. Dec. 465; Jackson *v.* Old Colony Street Railway, 206 Mass. 477, 485, 92 N. E. 725, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1046, 19 Ann. Cas. 615; Gorman *v.* Southern Pacific Co., 97 Cal. 1, 31 Pac. 1112, 33 Am. St. Rep. 157. In uttering incriminating words in the presence of his servants and the police officer, the defendant violated his contractual obligation to the plaintiffs as guests, of curtesy and respectful treatment, and freedom from humiliation, contempt and ridicule arising from slanderous verbal attacks.

"We are therefore of opinion that the cases come within the doctrine of Bryant *v.* Rich, 106 Mass. 180, Am. Rep. 311, and kindred decisions, and the plaintiffs can recover in contract, as fully as if they had sued in tort."

White Slave Traffic Act—Incidental Deviation into Another State. —In United States *v.* Wilson, 266 Fed. 712, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee held that the transportation of a woman between different points in the same state is not interstate transportation, within the meaning of the White Slave Traffic Act because the route taken incidentally passes through another state.

The court said in part: "Generally speaking interstate commerce

includes a continuous transportation from a point in one state to another point in the same state, partly by way of another state. However, the White Slave Traffic Act specifically provides that the words 'interstate commerce,' as used in the act, shall 'include transportation from any state or territory * * * to any other state or territory.' Act June 25, 1910, c. 395, § 1, 36 Stat. 825 (Comp. St. § 8812). This definition necessarily excludes, by implication, transportation from one point in a state to another point in the same state; the words 'from' and 'to', as used in the act, manifestly referring to two different states or territories as the respective points of origin and final destination of the transportation, and not to a state through which the woman is carried as a mere incident of the through transportation. See, by direct analogy, United States *v.* Gudger, 249 U. S. 373, 375, 39 Sup. Ct. 323, 63 L. Ed. 653, and Jones *v.* United States (6th Circ.) 259 Fed. 104, 106, 170 C. C. A. 172, involving a construction of the word 'into' as used in the Reed Amendment (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 8739a, 10387a-10387c).

"Hence, as the indictment merely charges transportation of the woman from one point to another in Tennessee, through Alabama, and does not charge that she was transported from Alabama as the point of origin to Tennessee, it necessarily follows that it does not state a case of transportation in interstate commerce, as defined in the White Slave Traffic Act."

Workmen's Compensation Act—Injured Employee Limited to Relief Given by Act.—In Heyett *v.* Northwestern, 180 N. W. 552, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that where a particular injury results in part in a temporary or permanent disability, and in part in the disfigurement of the person of the employee, or other injury not amounting to a disability, the employee is limited in his relief to that gven by the act, and an action at law for the injury not amounting to a disability canot be maintained.

Plaintiff was injured while engaged in his employment, by reason of which he was disabled for a brief period from the discharge of his duties, in adjustment of which there was paid to him the sum of $44. There were, as we understand the matter, no compensation proceedings, but that is not of special importance. At the time of the accident resulting in the disability stated plaintiff received an additional independent injury, but not amounting to a disability to perform his work, for which the Compensation Act makes no express or other provision for compensation. The additional injury was to his left pudic nerve, totally destroying the functions thereof, rendering him permanently impotent. Finding no remedy under the Compensation Act for the particular injury, plaintiff brought this